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1.  Introduction 
The protests that turned violent during the Genoa economic summit and the 
expense of hosting a summit measured against actual policy outcomes 
outcomes call for a rethinking of the significance of the high-profile 
international gatherings such as the annual economic summits, and perhaps 
even the regular meetings of international institutions such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.
1   The tragic events of September 
11 and the Madrid bombings question the wisdom of hosting events that bring 
together the leaders of the wealthiest nations in one location.  The current 
global governance framework is, after all, crowded with various summits. The 
principle consideration, therefore, is whether events such as the annual 
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economic summits contribute enough to global policymaking to warrant their 
continuation.
2   
  Because the economic summits are unique, in that they bring together 
the leaders as opposed to ministers and bureaucrats, expectations for the 
meetings to deliver ambitious agreements certainly run high.  But are the 
summits designed to deliver such agreements?  Should the leaders attempt to 
deliver ambitious and detailed agreements, even if they could?  Are there 
specific issues that are more likely to be resolved in a summit format as 
opposed to elsewhere?  This chapter considers what the annual summits were 
originally designed to accomplish, economic policy cooperation, the record of 
the summit accomplishments, how the summits evolved, and the role of the 
summits in the context of the global economic governance architecture.  This is 
done in the context of economic policymaking–the summit’s raison d’être–
and, therefore, looks past other important accomplishments and shortcomings 
of the summits.  For example, this chapter does not consider the importance of 
the summits in addressing issues of global terrorism, WMDs, and collective 
responses to North Korea and the Middle East (see Kirton, 2003).  Hence, the 
analysis here is very focus and, arguably, confined.   
  The central thesis of this paper is that the summits have contributed, 
though in a limited way, to international economic policy cooperation and the 
summit process is a significant organization in today’s global governance 
architecture.  Nonetheless, it is argued here that global economic stability 
depends, first and foremost, on good domestic economic policymaking.   
International policy cooperation, although ever more import in light of global 
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economic integration, is of second order importance for global stability.  Given 
this view, and the record of what the summits have and have not accomplished, 
the conclusion reached here is that the leaders should avoid international policy 
coordination packages and focus on sharing information.  This position is 
similar, but not as pessimistic as that of Razeen Sally (2001, p. 55) who states 
that “Most arguments for global governance are in fact bad economics and 
even worse political economy.”  Hence, the media and other critical observers 
who look for the summits to deliver concrete and detailed policy packages 
must realize that less may be better when it comes to the economic summits. 
 
2.  The Genesis of the Economic Summits 
The annual economic summits were born out of the “Library Group,” the 
informal meetings of the finance ministers (later the G5 meetings of the 
finance ministers).  These meetings began with an invitation from George 
Shultz to the finance ministers of Germany, France, and the U.K. to meet in the 
White House Library.  At that time, President Valery Giscard d’Estaing and 
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt participated in these meetings as finance ministers 
and felt these informal meetings should continue with their remaining G5 
counterparts (Armstrong, 1988). 
  Three realities motivated the first summit, hosted and organized by 
President Giscard in 1975.  First there was the realization that some global 
economic events, such as the 1973-1974 oil shocks, lie beyond the individual 
control of policymakers in the major industrialized economies.  Second, was 
the increasing integration of the advanced economies, and an increase in the 
number of problems common to these economies and shared by policymakers.  
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Third was the awareness that even in a flexible exchange rate regime, nations 
cannot conduct economic policy independent of one another. 
 
2.1  Purpose 
International economic policy cooperation was the formal purpose of the early 
summits.  Note that the summit declarations themselves often do not 
distinguish between international policy cooperation and international policy 
coordination.  To many economists, however, economic policy cooperation is 
the exchange of information designed to prevent or minimize the adverse 
spillovers of economic policy actions thereby minimizing common harm.  In 
contrast,  economic policy coordination is the activities that bring about 
significant changes in domestic policies in recognition of international 
interdependencies so as to maximize the common good (von Furstenberg and 
Daniels, 1992).  Policy coordination, therefore, is something much more 
concrete and ambitious than policy cooperation. 
In addition to international economic policy cooperation, the summits 
were also intended to serve as a forum for the leaders to settle issues that their 
ministers were unable to resolve.  In other words, the leaders would tackle the 
most difficult issues of the day.  The legitimization of floating exchange rates 
at the first economic summit is an example of an issue that had been eluding 
the leaders and ministers for a number of years.  (The agreement actually came 
about on the eve of the summit as pressure mounted on U.S. and French 
deputies.)  The resolution and completion of the Uruguay round of trade 
negotiation is another example of the summit participants taking on issues their 
ministers had been unable to resolve. 
 
2.2  Structure The Significance of the Economic Summits  5
President Giscard envisioned the first summit as a one-time meeting of the 
leaders, although with hindsight it is clear that the Rambouillet summit would 
spark a full cycle of summit meetings.  The early summit meetings were 
designed to be exclusive and top down in structure.  These two features remain 
to day.  In spite of the addition of Canada and Russia, and frequent invitations 
to include the President of the European Union, the summit remains an 
exclusive, private club whose members are in complete control of the club’s 
membership.  Keeping with the original top-down structure, the summits 
remain aloft of other organizations and do not act laterally with any other 
international institution. 
It was also hoped that the summits would remain flexible and able to 
respond to shared crises of the day.  Once the summits settled on an annual 
timetable, some of this flexibility was lost.  The ability of the summits to react 
timely to pressing problems soon became a point of debate.  For example, 
according to a sous-sherpa the Japanese delegation warned their counterparts 
of an impending crisis in Thailand during the 1997 Denver summit.
3  A  
preoccupation with “the U.S. economic model,” a failed E.U. summit that took 
place immediately prior to the economic summit, the obvious lack of an 
agenda by the host country, and the unwillingness of the Japanese to press the 
issue, however, left the impending crisis off the already crowded agenda. 
The 1998 Birmingham summit was also conspicuously mute on the 
1997 financial crisis.  At this summit, both the mainstream media and the 
Summit participants were focused on other current non-economic issues.  The 
U.S. media was most interested in an unfolding domestic crisis for the U.S. 
President as details of a dalliance with an intern were unfolding at home.   
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Perhaps, this was the reason for U.S. officials holding press conferences at a 
hotel near the airport as opposed to the central-city media facility where all 
other press conferences were held.  The other issue of the day was the 
detonation of a nuclear device by India.  Though the U.S. pressed for a 
multilateral response to India’s actions, a policy action consensus could not be 
reached (due mostly to a yet unused Glenn Amendment that automatically 
triggered U.S. unilateral sanctions).
4   
In spite of the summits becoming something of a pseudo-institution, 
they still remain more independent, elevated, and flexible than other 
international organizations.  Because of these characteristics, the summit can 
be seen as a policy concert; a non-institution that relies on a small number of 
rules.  A policy concert serves mainly to cooperate in policy formation rather 
than follow rules established to manage international relations (Kirton, 1989 
and Schwegmann, 2002).  It is this characteristic that is the strong point and 
distinctiveness of the annual summits. 
 
3.  The Record of the Summits 
In spite of the fact that the original summit was envisioned as a “fire-side 
chat,” the global media and other interested summit watchers continue to 
expect the leaders to do much more than just exchange views.  The 
communiqué, the public document generated by the summit process, is 
continuously scrutinized for signs of quantitative policy commitments.  summit 
watchers expect the summits to deliver international policy coordination 
packages as opposed to merely facilitate policy cooperation.  In spite of this 
                                            
4 The Glenn amendment requires automatic sanctions against a nation detonating a nuclear 
device, allowing the President but a few days to invoke the sanctions unilaterally or presenting 
a case against said sanctions to Congress.  With his hands tied by the amendment, President 
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sanctions. The Significance of the Economic Summits  7
pressure, actual examples of international policy coordination are not so easy 
to find. 
 
3.1  Examples of Policy Coordination During the 1970s and 1980s 
Many economists regard the 1978 Bonn Summit as the hallmark of policy 
coordination.  At this summit, the leaders committed to a policy package where 
the economies of Germany and Japan were to be stimulated through fiscal 
measures, thereby spurring economic growth throughout the G7 economies–a 
locomotive effect.  The other G7 nations, the United States in particular, were 
to contain inflationary pressures.  A tripling of crude oil prices by OPEC the 
following June halted efforts to complete the package of policy measures.  This 
policy package was later criticized, especially in Germany, for merely adding 
to inflationary pressures.   
  Some economists, in contrast, argue that the 1978 summit is not a true 
example of international policy coordination.  Their claim is that the 1978 
agreement does not represent an adjustment of policies that would not have 
otherwise been undertaken without any such agreement to coordinate 
(Theuringer, 2001).  Because the policy measures were likely to be undertaken 
unilaterally, it is not an effort to bring about significant changes in domestic 
policies due to international linkages and the promotion of international 
common good. 
  The Plaza-Louvre period of the last half of the 1980s is sometimes 
offered as another example of international policy coordination.  During this 
period, the advanced economy nations engaged in substantial and coordinated 
foreign exchange interventions designed to bring down the value of the dollar.  Joseph P. Daniels 
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These interventions, however, were sterilized.
5  Hence, there was an 
unwillingness to allow these coordinated foreign exchange interventions to 
affect domestic economies.  In addition, the view among academic economists 
is that sterilized foreign exchange intervention was effective in the short run 
only, or at best.  Indeed this view found its way into the Jurgenson Report of 
1983, which was commissioned by the leaders at the Vesailles Summit in 1982 
(Sarno and Taylor, 2001).  Being unwilling to subordinate domestic economic 
policy to achieve an international and shared objective, this era, therefore, does 
not represent policy coordination either. 
 
3.2  The Empirical Evidence 
Empirical examinations of the first two rounds of the annual summits further 
show that policymakers were either unwilling or unable to fulfill economic 
policy commitments agreed upon and put forward in the summit 
communiqués.  von Furstenberg and Daniels (1992) develop a metric for 
gauging the degree of compliance on policy commitments formed at the 
summits.  Using empirical evidence on outcomes, their research indicates that 
policymakers delivered on about one-third of their economic policy 
commitments.  The summits, for example, receive relatively poor scores on 
commitments to stabilize exchange rates and relatively higher scores on trade 
and energy commitments.  The conclusion they reach is that policymakers are 
better at delivering on microeconomic commitments rather than 
macroeconomic ones. 
  The summit communiqués not only reveal the policy undertakings 
themselves, they also provide glimpses of what the undertakings are promised 
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to achieve.  In this way, some of the general economic relationships and 
means-ends linkages that policymakers subscribe to also come to light.  As 
Richard Cooper (1985) points out, even if policymakers have compatible 
objectives and similar economic conditions, they may disagree on their 
forecasts of future events and the structure of economies and, therefore, the 
relationship of means to ends.   
  There are very few empirical studies of the means-ends relationship 
advanced in the economic declarations.  Daniels (1993) inventories the 
relationships found in the first fifteen summit declarations.  This study finds 
that most of the economic relationships, or understandings, can be 
characterized as arguable.  That is, the means-ends relationship found in the 
communiqué can neither be rejected by the empirical evidence nor supported 
in a statistical sense.  On the one hand, the conclusion that policymakers 
generally do not commit themselves to undertakings based on economic 
assumptions that are very risky or run the chance that they may be rejected 
outright by future empirical study is not too remarkable.  On the other hand, it 
is a bit surprising that policymakers do not completely “play it safe” and rely 
only on economic relationships that are beyond dispute. 
  Of course the first of these studies focuses on quantitative 
commitments to achieve some economic outcome and, therefore, are primarily 
examples of policy coordination.  The second, however, examines the 
framework in which these commitments were made and can be seen more so as 
a measure of economic policy cooperation.  Because of the low score on 
policy undertakings and the relatively neutral grade on means-ends 
relationships, one must conclude that the summits should primarily serve to 
cooperate rather than coordinate.  Furthermore, policy cooperation must take 
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precedence on policy coordination.  After all, the leaders must first come to 
agreement on their economic assessments, forecasts, and economic ideology 
before subscribing to policy undertakings intended to achieve some specific 
objective.   
The evidence cited above shows why there is considerable opposition 
to international economic policy coordination, especially among German and 
U.S. economists, but support for greater policy cooperation.  Clearly another 
reason for this resistance is the recognition that policymakers face a 
“technological constraint” (Blackburn and Christenson 1989), that is, there is a 
limit to what economists know and on the quality of their advice and forecasts.  
Another reason is that is has been shown (for example, Frankel and Rockett 
1988) that coordination based on incorrect information or models can actually 
be counterproductive.  Finally, if German and U.S. finance ministers were to 
coordinate on foreign exchange rates, thereby committing their central banks to 
monetary policy actions, this could compromise the autonomy of their central 
banks and jeopardize their hard fought stocks of central bank credibility. 
  More recently there have been some examples of policy coordination  
(though these policy packages, however, have yet to be fully recognized.)  The 
first example is the reform of the international financial architecture and the 
second is multilateral initiative on debt relief for the Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) as reinforced by the Cologne initiative of 1999.  It is quite 
possible, in the very near future, that we will count the financial fight against 
terrorism as the fruit of improvements in internationally coordinated efforts to 
combat transnational crime.  
 
3.3  Uneven Success   
Whether or not the above examples are “true” examples of international policy 
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summits as a global governance body is uneven.  Even though the summiteers 
may have a view from the highest perspective possible, they are certainly no 
better at predicting crises than lower-level participants.   
Two recent examples of economic policy cooperation failures are the 
inability to collectively recognize an impending collapse of an inflated 
Japanese economy and, as mentioned earlier, the summit participants refusal to 
heed Japan’s warning of a possible crisis in Thailand in the spring of 1997.  An 
example of policy coordination failures is that incapacity to pass a multilateral 
agreement on investment (in spite of the fact that investment flows continue to 
increase at rates much greater than those seen in global trade.)  In regard to 
trade, the summits have demonstrated the ability to generate critical 
multilateral decision-making, or a “Rambouillet effect,” resulting in marginal 
progress during periods of multilateral negotiations (Ullrich, 2004).   
Nonetheless, the summits failed to dampen rising regionalism, and, particularly 
during the Clinton administration, made little or no progress in expanding trade 
on a multilateral basis need to provide better leadership, especially when 
multilateral negotiations stall. 
Why, then, are the summits successful in some areas, but not others?  
Some policymakers and academics agree that perhaps the best single 
explanation of the uneven success of the summits lies in the competence of the 
ministry responsible for implementing the specific undertaking agreed to by 
the leaders (Kokotsis, 1999).  Those intimately involved see the finance 
ministers’ policy process as the most developed and displaying the most 
coordination and follow through, with the foreign ministers being second in 
this regard.  In addition, the foreign ministers have well-established links to 
institutions such as the Paris Club, the IMF, and the World Bank. 
 
4.  The Marginalizing of Economics Joseph P. Daniels 
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The 1978 Bonn Summit represents a turning point for the economic summits.  
At the end of this summit, the leaders issued a joint statement on hijacking.  
This statement shows that the summit agenda, for the first time, included issues 
other than global economics and marks the gradual marginalizing of 
economics, as economic issues receive less and less attention with each round 
of summits.   
By the early 1990s, economic issues received limited space on the 
summit agenda.  Except for the Cologne summit, global economic policy 
continues to receive less attention at the summits despite calls by policymakers 
such as Gordon Brown, U.K. finance minister, to “put economics back into the 
summit.”   
This marginalizing of economics is also due in part to the inclusion of 
Russia as a near-full participant in 1997 and member in 1998.  Russia was, and 
still is economically asymmetric to the other G7 members.  Its inclusion, 
therefore, reflects the aim to use the economic summits to achieve political 
objectives, as opposed to economic ones.  The inclusion of Russia may also 
signal another important change in the summits for the near future:  the 
inclusion of China as a member and the move to a G9.  If China continues to 
move forward with reforms and participates in a greater number of important 
institutions (e.g., permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, 
member of the G20, and member of the World Trade Organization), it 
increases this possibility. 
Some observers claim that the conversion to the Euro may spark a 
change in the G8 process as well.  The argument is that there will be a fewer 
number of G8 nations with independent monetary policy.  Hence, the summit 
may evolve to a triad plus Russia organization, that is North American, Europe 
and Japan plus Russia.  This is unlikely, however, as monetary policy has 
never been part of the economic summits in the first place.  The Significance of the Economic Summits  13
 
5.  The Significance of the Economic Summits in Today’s  
Global Governance Architecture 
The introduction to this paper stressed that it is good domestic economic 
policymaking that is critical to global economic stability.  Good domestic 
economic policymaking spurs economic growth, creates an environment to 
promote financial stability, and reduces the gap between those who have and 
those who have not.  The annual economic summits, therefore, can only 
promote global economic stability by improving upon domestic economic 
policy making through international economic policy cooperation. 
 
5.1  Cooperate, not Coordinate 
If global economic stability is improved, first and foremost, through good 
domestic policymaking, then there is no institution, even the summits, that 
serves as the ultimate centre for global economic governance.  This is a very 
specific claim, however, as it focuses on economic issues only.  It may well be 
that the summits are at the centre of global governance, which encompasses 
much more than economic issues.  Nonetheless, the summits, therefore, should 
be seen first and foremost as a means for improving and generating better 
domestic policies as opposed to delivering packages of coordinated policies 
designed to enhance collective or joint welfare. 
  Other than testing means-ends relationships that might be found in the 
declarations, the effects of international policy cooperation—sharing 
information and ideas—cannot be measured.  What is unpalatable about this 
position to the media and academic observers of the summit process (this 
author included) is that it means that we cannot quantitatively evaluate the 
significance of the summit process.  Hence, we cannot argue with any rigor, 
that the summits accomplished anything or not.  We can evaluate qualitatively Joseph P. Daniels 
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the achievements of the summits, assessing the appropriateness of was 
discussed (which is done annually be the G8 Research Group at the University 
of Toronto and posted on the G8 Website at www.g7.utoronto.ca.) 
Sharing of information internationally, however, can do much to 
improve domestic economic policymaking.  Certainly the summits are 
uniquely suited to international policy cooperation.  Having the highest view, 
the leaders must surely see farther than ministers and bureaucrats.  Hence, 
when the leaders of the G8 come together and discuss economics conditions it 
must be worth more than just idle talk.  By reaching understandings, as 
opposed to agreements or undertakings, the summits are well prepared to set 
broad visions and aid in domestic economic policymaking. 
 
5.2 Improving the Process 
Now that some limits have been imposed on what the summits can reasonably 
deliver in terms of economic policymaking, what do this mean for the summit 
process itself?  In order to build and maintain the credibility of the process, the 
G8 should not set themselves up as a “Super Cabinet” or directoire for global 
governance (Hodges, 1994), and in spite of pressure by the media for the 
summits to produced hard agreements and detailed solutions to world 
problems, the leaders must avoid giving the impression that they are capable of 
dealing with all issues and solving all crises. 
In spite of this limitation, the summits provide the best “bully pulpit” to 
advance perspectives on globalization.  This is, arguably, their most important 
responsibility, because international trade and engagement in the global 
marketplace is still seen by a majority of people in the advanced nations as a 
zero-sum game.  There is no better forum that could be used to articulate the 
benefits to a nation’s residents from participating in the global marketplace.  
And yet, this opportunity remains to be fully utilized. The Significance of the Economic Summits  15
Of course the summit process can be improved upon and there are a 
number of proposals on how to do so (see Hodges, Kirton, and Daniels, 1999).  
In terms of global economic policy, and in light of the evidence and views 
given herein, the summit process could be improved by: 
1.  Streamlining the process along the lines recommended by John Major 
in 1992. 
2.  Removing from the agenda any domestic economic issues not fully 
internationalized.  Or, in other words, remove those issues that do not 
hold the possibility of assembling international synergies. 
3.  Focusing on issues whose means-ends relationships are well 
understood so that ministers can see them to fruition. 
4.  Working for agreements in areas where leaders have real authority.  For 
example, monetary policy should continue to be off the table since the 
leaders do not hold any authority in this area. 
5.  Working for agreements in areas where credible and effective domestic 
institutions exist 
6.  Continuing to communicate well with ministers. 
7.  Avoid giving the impression that the summits can solve every problem, 
or “lower expectations, cool the temperature and even try to ignore the 
heads of state” (Hodges, 1999, p. 72). 
Given this menu for improvement, what are the issues that should be 
addressed at the summits?  The most obvious would be to revive the stalled 
Doha Trade Round.  Another issue that also has important humanitarian 
implications for developing nations is to continue multilateral debt relief 
without substituting it for continued development assistance.  
 
6.  Conclusion Joseph P. Daniels 
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It is argued here that the summits should not be transformed or elevated to 
some system of global economic governance.  Rather, global economic 
stability depends on good domestic economic policymaking and, therefore, the 
economic summits cannot substitute for effective and efficient policymaking 
within sovereign nations.  The summits, therefore, should be seen first and 
foremost as a means for improving and generating better domestic policies via 
cooperation as opposed to delivering packages of coordinated policies.  By 
focusing on international economic policy cooperation, the summits can 
contribute much to improving domestic economic policymaking. 
The protest at the Genoa summit and the events of September 11 
provide a well-timed opportunity to rethink the format of the summits, to 
streamline the process, and to return to the European or Rambouillet model of 
summitry.  Perhaps this is the path the summits are on following the “secluded 
and intimate” 2002 summit in Kananaskis (Bayne, 2002).   
The world was a very uncertain place in 1975.  There were oil shocks, 
an unsettled foreign-exchange system, and a global recession.  The original 
summit was formed to deal with these uncertainties.  The world is again an 
uncertain place, with financial crises, the emergence of Russia and China as 
political and economic forces, terrorist attacks on the United States, an 
economic downturn among the advanced economies, and turbulence in the 
world’s equity markets.  The annual summits remain as a significant forum for 
sharing information and reducing this uncertainty. 
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